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THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF BANK BRANCHING EXPENDITURES:
CENTRAL TEXAS SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION v. UNITED
STATES: A WEAK REBUTTAL TO NCNB CORP. v. UNITED
STATES
In North Carolina National Bank Corp. v. United States,' the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that certain expenditures2 incurred
by a national bank in connection with, yet prior to, the opening of branch
offices were deductible under I.R.C. section 162 as ordinary business ex-
penses. 3 In Central Texas Savings & Loan Association v. United States,4
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that similar5 costs in-
curred by a savings and loan institution in its branching activities6 were
capital7 rather than ordinary in nature, and could not be deducted under
section 162.
In both cases, the controverted expenditures included expenses for pro-
curing branch licenses" and for studying the economic feasibility of each
new location.9 There were some minor factual differences between the two
cases in that NCNB, a much larger company,10 also expended funds for a
1. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
2. The expenditures at issue do not include those relating to tangible assets such as land,
building, and equipment costs. These are readily conceded as capital. Id. at 293. For a
description of the costs at issue, see infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
3. LRC. § 162 (1976) (allows for certain business expenses to be deducted in full in the
year in which they are incurred). Section 162 expenses are often referred to as "ordinary"
expenses because the ordinary requirement is considered the essence of a business expense.
See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
4. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
5. The Central Texas Corp. did not expend any funds for the general market studies,
while NCNB did. Otherwise, the expenditures in the two cases were basically the same. See
infra note 11.
6. "Branching" will be used to refer to the general practice of existing banks opening new
branches. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 946 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
7. IRC. § 263 (1976). Items which are deemed to be capital in nature must be amortized
over the life of the resulting benefit, if that life is determinable. If the life is not determina-
ble, the cost may not be recovered until liquidation or sale of the asset created. See Note,
Start-up Cost Treatment Under § 195: Tax Disparity in Disguise, 36 OKLA L. REv. 449, 450
(1983).
8. In order to open a branch one must obtain approval from the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (for a national bank) or the Savings and Loan Commissioner (for a savings and loan)
which involves attorney's fees, sometimes very substantial. For the purposes of the issues
discussed in this article, the many differences between banks and savings and loans do not
appear important. The tax laws are identical for both types of lending institutions.
9. Location feasibility studies assess potential profitability. See NCNB, 684 F.2d at 289.
10. NCNB opened 57 new branches between the years 1970-1973. Id. at 286. Central
Texas, on the other hand, only opened four branches from its inception to the date of its
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second "metro" study," and that Central Texas, .a state-regulated savings
and loan, was subject to different licensing procedures. 12 Yet the conflict-
ing results reached in NCNB and Central Texas stem not from any dis-
tinguishing factual differences but from disparate views concerning the
proper test for determining what is an "ordinary business expense."
For an expenditure to be deductible as a business expense, it must
meet the three basic requirements of section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code: (1) it must be incurred or paid in the taxable year; (2) it must be
incurred while carrying on a trade or business; and (3) it must be a neces-
sary and ordinary expense.' 3 The first requirement is an easily deter-
mined one and is rarely the subject of litigation. 14 This note examines the
remaining two requirements as they relate to the NCNB decision, concen-
trating primarily on the meaning of the "ordinary" requirement. It then
analyzes the Central Texas decision as a rebuttal to NCNB, and offers
some insight as to the probable resolution of the conflict between the two
cases.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 162(a)
The major issue in both NCNB and Central Texas is whether the con-
tested expenditures are "ordinary."' 15 This issue is closely related to the
"carrying on a trade or business" requirement of section 162(a).16 There-
fore, an understanding of the "carrying on" requirement is essential to a
full comprehension of the NCNB rationale. 7
case. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1182.
11. The metro studies were of an entire metropolitan area-not just a potential branch
location. See NCNB, 684 F.2d at 289.
12. The only significant difference noted by the court was that the Central Texas license
gave it the right to challenge the entry of competitors into the local market. See supra note
8. See also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
14. The requirement that expenditures be paid or incurred during the taxable year was
conceded by the government in both NCNB and Central Texas. Disputes in this area usu-
ally arise only when a taxpayer on a cash accounting basis relies on the "incurred" require-
ment, or when a taxpayer on an accrual accounting basis relies on the "paid" requirement.
See, e.g., Burrows v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 236 (1938).
15. See Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1183; NCNB, 684 F.2d at 287.
16. The relationship is based on the idea that if an expense is eligible under section 195
for amortization, then it must, by nature, be ordinary. As an "ordinary" expense, it is de-
ductible if incurred by an existing business. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
17. While the Central Texas opinion ignores the relationship of the "carrying on" and
"ordinary" requirements under section 195, according to Pat Beard, the attorney for Central
Texas Savings and Loan Association, the argument was raised by Central Texas, and is a
viable point. Telephone interview with Pat Beard, Beard & Kultgen (Oct. 3, 1984).
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A. In Carrying on a Trade or Business
Frequently a business seeking to deduct an item as a section 162 ex-
pense will be denied the deduction because the taxpayer has no currently
operating business to which the expenditures could be attributed-that
is, the taxpayer is not "carrying on" an existing trade or business. This
"existing business" requirement often arises when a new business incurs
substantial "start-up" expenses before its actual operations begin., The
requirement also applies, however, in the somewhat less obvious situation
where an existing business incurs substantial costs in developing or ac-
quiring a new, additional business, prior to the commencement of that
new business.'9 In both of these situations, there is no "existing business"
and so the "carrying on" requirement of section 162 is not satisfied. Any
deduction of such expenses would be disallowed by the I.R.S.
Prior to adoption of section 195 of the Code,'20 expenditures which
failed to pass the existing business (or new business/old business") test
for deductibility had to be capitalized. 2 2 In an effort to ease the burden of
these "start up" costs, Congress enacted section 195, which allows a tax-
payer to amortize such pre-opening23 expenditures over a period of no
less than sixty months.24 It is important to note that the expenditures
18. In this situation, the issue is usually whether the taxpayer's activities have risen to
the level of a trade or business. See, e.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345
F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965); Petersburg Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 271
(1961); Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332 (1953).
19. In this second situation, the issue is usually whether or not the new business is of a
significantly different type from the existing business. See, e.g., Malmstead v. Commis-
sioner, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978) (hotel venture sufficiently related to existing residential
real estate business-deduction allowed); Radio Station WBIR, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31
T.C. 803 (1959) (expenditures incurred by a radio station relating to its development of a
television station were not sufficiently related to the radio business to meet the existing
business requirement).
20. I.I.C. § 195 (1981) became effective on July 29, 1980, and offered some relief for tax-
payers incurring "start up" costs.
21. See Note, Costs of Expanding an Existing Business: Current Deductions Versus
Capital Expenditures-North Carolina National Bank Corp. v. United States, 18 WAKE
FOREST L. RaV. 1127, 1132 (1982). (The new business/old business test, as it is often referred
to, simply restates the existing business requirement: if the cost relates to the old business,
it is deductible, but if it relates to a new business it is a capital item.).
22. Frequently, with capitalization, these costs could not be amortized or depreciated be-
cause they gave rise to benefits with indeterminate lives. Hence the costs could only be
recovered upon sale or liquidation of the asset. [1984] 3 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) I
1999YF.01.
23. Section 195 refers to the costs as start-up expenditures, which are meant to include
amounts incurred in connection with (i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active
business, or (ii) creating an active business, or which, if incurred in connection with the
operation of an existing business, would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year.
LR.C. § 195(b) (1981).
24. Id. § 195(a).
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
which may be amortized under section 195 are those which would have
been deductible under section 162, but for the fact that they failed to
satisfy the existing business requirement.25
While the tax years at issue in both the NCNB and Central Texas de-
cisions preceded the passage of section 195,26 the close relationship be-
tween sections 195 and 162 had important implications in both cases.
Thus, an understanding of the relationship between the two sections is
necessary in analyzing the divergent results reached by the NCNB and
Central Texas courts. The relationship between sections 195 and 162 was
essential to the NCNB court's determination that branch development
costs were "ordinary" and thus deductible under section 162,2" while the
Central Texas court disregarded the relationship between the two sec-
tions in reaching the opposite result.
B. Necessary and Ordinary Expenses
In addition to the "carrying on" requirement, section 162 also requires
that an expenditure be both necessary and ordinary in order to be de-
ductible. 28 The "necessary" provision has been held to constitute only a
minimal requirement-it requires only that the expense be appropriate
and helpful for the development of a business. 29 The "ordinary" require-
ment, however, is often the benchmark for distinguishing between what is
by nature a business expense, and what is by nature a capital expendi-
ture. 0 Consequently, what is "ordinary" is frequently the major issue be-
tween the government and the taxpayer."
1. The Future Benefit Test
Courts have relied on various tests and definitions to interpret the "or-
dinary expense" language of section 162(a).32 One such test, which
25. Eligible expenses are those "which, if paid or incurred in connection with the expan-
sion of an existing trade or business . . . would be allowable as a deduction . . . ." Id. §
195(b). In other words, only those expenses which are deductible in nature (i.e., ordinary
expenses) are eligible for section 195 amortization. See NCNB, 684 F.2d at 295 (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting).
26. Section 195 was not retroactive. The question of whether or not the expenditures were
eligible under section 195 was not yet ripe for adjudication. See, e.g., Central Texas, 731
F.2d at 1186.
27. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 291.
28. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976).
29. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966).
30. Id. at 690; Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 610 (1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
31. See, e.g., NCNB, 684 F.2d at 287.
32. See, e.g., Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) (expense is ordinary if transaction
which gives rise to the expense commonly occurs in the particular type of business in-
volved); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) (ordinary does not mean payments
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originated in the Tenth Circuit33 and gained wide acceptance3 4 for many
years, was the future benefit test. Under the future benefit test, an expen-
diture would not be considered ordinary if it resulted in the "acquisition
of an asset having a period of useful life in excess of one year or if it
secure[d] a like advantage to the taxpayer which [had] a life of more than
one year.
'3 5
2. The Separate and Distinct Asset Test
The future benefit test was the primary tool used by courts in deter-
mining whether an expense was ordinary until it was rejected in Commis-
sioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association s.3 The new test adopted by
the Lincoln court for identifying a capital (as opposed to an ordinary)
expenditure was whether the expenditure "serves to create or enhance
. . . what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset . .... ,,7
Applying this test, the Court held that payments made by Lincoln Sav-
ings and Loan into an FSLIC secondary reserve fund were not ordinary,
but capital in nature .
3
It is important to note that the Court in the Lincoln decision could
easily have reached the same holding using the future benefit test.3 9 In
must be habitual in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often); A.
Giurlani & Bro. Inc. v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 1941) (ordinary is a varia-
ble affected by time, place and circumstance which should be given its usual, every-day
connotation).
33. See Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
34. See, e.g., Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1980); Cagle v.
Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1976); Bilar Tool & Die Corp. v. Commissioner,
530 F.2d 708, 713 (6th Cir. 1976); Paxman v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 265, 267 (10th Cir.
1969); American Dispenser Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Richmond
Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) (while primary basis for
disallowing a section 162 deduction was failure to meet the existing business requirement,
an alternative rationale was that the costs were not "ordinary" under the future benefit
test); United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957) (though Hotel Kingkade
preceded Akin, Akin is usually cited as the source of the test's origin); Frankford Quaker
Grocery Co. v United States, 353 F. Supp. 93, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Clark Oil & Refining Corp.
v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 145, 149 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
35. Hotel Kingkade, 180 F.2d at 312. For courts which relied on the future benefit (or one
year) test, the issue usually became one of accounting. Revenues necessarily had to be
matched, as well as possible, against costs in the appropriate period. If the revenues ex-
tended longer than a year, the cost was considered capital. For a good example of such an
application of the future benefit test, see North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. United States, 651
F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd en banc, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
36. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
37. Id. at 354.
38. Id. at 364.
39. The Supreme Court could simply have held, as did the Tax Court whose ruling the
Court affirmed, that because the payments resulted in a benefit (in the form of insurance
coverage) with "a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable
year ... " the payments represented capital expenditures. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assoc.
1984]
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adopting the "separate and distinct asset" test, however, the court elected
to reject the "conceptual simplicity"4 of the future benefit test, noting
that there are "many expenses concededly deductible [under section 162
which] have prospective effect beyond the taxable year."41
The NCNB majority, in accepting the Lincoln "separate and distinct
asset" test as controlling,42 ruled that the new branch offices, 43 though
enhanced by the expenditures at issue, 4 were not separate and distinct
additional assets. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
compared the branching activities of the bank to the efforts of a candy
company in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner"5 to develop new
sales territory. The court held that the branch offices constituted no more
separate and distinct assets than did the franchise arrangements Briar-
cliff established in order to gain new markets.46
The NCNB court also compared the situation before it to several credit
card cases which held that a bank, in establishing a new credit card ser-
vice for customers, did not create a separate and distinct asset.41 The
court reasoned that NCNB's efforts to expand into new markets were
similr to the credit card expenditures in that they only "introduced a
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 82, 98 (1968).
40. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 288-89.
41. Lincoln, 403 U.S. at 354. The future benefit test was never mandated by the Supreme
Court as the primary consideration for "capital" versus "ordinary" issues.
There is one difficulty in interpreting the Lincoln case as an absolute rejection of the
future benefit test. The problem stems from the Court's post-Lincoln ruling in United
States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972). In that case the Supreme Court held
that cooperative bank stock purchased by the taxpayer was a capital asset due to its future
benefit beyond the tax year. That application of the future benefit rule, however, appears to
be confined to the facts of Mississippi Chemical because, as the Court noted, Congress had
specifically and intentionally created the long-term characteristics of cooperative bank stock
in order to provide both a stable membership and permanent capital for the regional bank.
Id. at 304. See also Farm Credit Act, 69 Stat. 656, 12 U.S.C. § 1134d(a)(3) (1955). Missis-
sippi Chemical thus appears to be treated by the Court as a congressionally mandated ex-
ception to the Lincoln rule.
42. Acceptance of the Lincoln test was the major issue in the en banc reversal of the
NCNB panel decision, which had relied heavily on the future benefit rule. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd en banc, 684 F.2d 285
(4th Cir. 1982). This was not even an issue in Central Texas, nor, in all probability, would it
be a major issue before the Supreme Court today. See infra note 124.
43. The court emphasized that the costs relating to tangible property such as land, build-
ings and equipment, were concededly capital under section 263. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 293.
44. The notion that the costs enhanced the branch offices was not contested. See NCNB
v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 960 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
But that enhancement is irrelevant under the Lincoln rationale if what is enhanced is ruled
not to be a separate and distinct asset.
45. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 290, 291.
47. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977);
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
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more efficient method of conducting an old business. 48
In addition to dismissing the notion that the branch offices were sepa-
rate and distinct assets, the Fourth Circuit also rejected the claim that
the branch licenses were separate and distinct assets.49 The decisions
which held licenses to be capital assets were not persuasive to the NCNB
court because these decisions either resulted from an application of the
future benefit rule50 or involved the establishment of a new business.5 1
Moreover, the court noted that unlike most of the license cases cited by
the government, the NCNB branch license was neither transferable nor
an exclusive franchise-thus, there was very little support for the notion
that the license was a separate and distinct asset.52
3. Senate Report on Section 195
The NCNB court did not rely solely on the Lincoln test to show that
the disputed expenditures were ordinary. The court also relied on the
Senate Report accompanying section 19551 to justify its position.
The Senate Report states that "eligible expenses [under section 195]
consist of investigatory costs incurred in reviewing a prospective business
prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or enter that business. These
costs include expenses incurred in the analysis or survey of potential mar-
kets... .""
This is where the relationship between sections 162 and 195 becomes
vital. As noted earlier,55 expenses eligible under section 195 are, by na-
ture, "ordinary business expenses." The primary reason such expenses are
not deductible under section 162 is simply that they fail to meet the "ex-
isting business" requirement. Since Congress cited "investigatory costs"
48. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 291.
49. Even if the branch operating license itself was shown to be a separate asset, not all
three types of expenditures at issue would necessarily be capital. Only those costs incurred
in obtaining the license (possibly including some feasibility studies to the extent they were
required to prove potential profitability to the Comptroller before issuance of the license)
would be deemed capital.
50. See, e.g., Chandler Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 TAX CT. MA DEC.
(CCH) 1372 (1973).
51. See, e.g., WHEC, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 821 (1962) (a local truck line's efforts
to establish nationwide routes was more than just business expansion; it related to a new
business, so the license costs were capital items); Radio Station WBIR, Inc. v Commissioner,
31 T.C. 803 (1959) (license expenditures considered capital items).
52. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 292.
53. See S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. II, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7293, 7301 [hereinafter cited S. REP.]. For an explanation of how section 195 and the
Report relate to section 162, see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
54. S. REP., supra note 53, at 7301.
55. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
1984]
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as expenses eligible under section 195,16 the NCNB court considered this
a congressional determination that "investigatory costs" would be deduct-
ible under section 162(a) but for the existing business requirement.57
NCNB was undisputedly an existing business.58 Because it was already
in the banking business, NCNB's branching activities could not be con-
sidered forays into a "new" business; therefore, the "existing business"
requirement was clearly met. The court then ruled that the expenses in-
curred by NCNB for metro studies and location feasibility studies were
"investigatory expenses." Consequently, the expenses were deductible
under section 162.59
4. Accounting Considerations
A final factor in considering whether an expenditure is an ordinary ex-
pense or capital expenditure is the relevant accounting method of the
taxpayer. When a taxpayer is subject to a compulsory accounting method
by a governmental agency, the Supreme Court has held that that method
will control federal income tax consequences, provided the method clearly
reflects income.60
The accounting method required by the Comptroller of the Currency
(to which NCNB was subject) charged to current operations "all expendi-
tures relating to the development and expansion of banking services
56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 291.
58. Id. at 287.
59. Id. The dissenting opinion held that the expenses could not be deducted. NCNB, 684
F.2d at 295-96. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) Judge Murnaghan's dissent is based on an im-
precise reading of the Report. The relevant portion of the Report reads as follows:
Eligible Expenditures
In general, expenditures eligible for amortization must satisfy two requirements.
First, the expenditure must be paid or incurred in connection with creating, or inves-
tigating the creation or acquisition of, a trade or business entered into by the tax-
payer. Second, the expenditure involved must be one which would be allowable as a
deduction for the taxable year in which it is paid or incurred if it were paid or in-
curred in connection with the expansion of an existing trade or business in the same
field as that entered into by the taxpayer.
Under the provision, eligible expenses consist of investigatory costs incurred in re-
viewing a prospective business prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or to enter
that business. These costs include expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of
potential markets ....
S. REP., supra note 53, at 7301.
Judge Murnaghan claims that the investigatory costs mentioned are not all includi-
ble-only those which satisfy the first two general requirements or which are ordinary in
nature. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 295. This interpretation, however, ignores the structure of the
Report, which implies that the investigatory costs specifically mentioned as eligible ex-
penses are presumed to have met the two preceding, general requirements.
60. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1974).
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.... M6 The only issue for the NCNB court was whether the required
accounting method clearly reflected income.62 Because the Comptroller
was in a "unique position of expertise to determine what accurately re-
flects a bank's income,"'6 3 the court reasoned that the Comptroller's
method should dictate the tax consequences and held that the contro-
verted costs were current, ordinary expenses.6 4
II. Central Texas Savings & Loan Association v. United States:
65
CASE AND ANALYSIS
In Central Texas Savings & Loan Association v. United States,6 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also examined the issue of whether
expenditures incurred by a bank prior to the opening of branch offices
were deductible as section 162 business expenses.6 7 While agreeing with
the NCNB court that the Lincoln test was the proper tool for determin-
ing if the contested expenditures were ordinary expenses, the Central
Texas court differed in its application of that test. The Fifth Circuit held
that the new branch offices of Central Texas Savings & Loan were sepa-
rate and distinct additional assets;68 thus, the expenditures enhancing the
value of these assets were capital in nature and therefore not deductible
under section 162. In addition, the court addressed what it perceived as
two other ways in which the expenditures fell short of the section 162
requirements: (1) they did not meet the existing business requirement;
and (2) they did not meet a "benefit exhausted" requirement. 9
A. The Existing Business Requirement
The Central Texas court first discussed what it viewed as the failure of
the contested expenditures to meet the "carrying on a trade or business"
requirement of section 162(a).7 0 Citing Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commis-
sioner,7 1 the court claimed it would be anomolous to say that one savings
and loan acquiring another must capitalize the investigative costs, while a
61. Letter from Comptroller of Currency for NCNB to the Assistant Sec. for Tax Policy,
U. S. Treasury Dep't. (Aug. 21, 1972), cited in NCNB, 684 F.2d at 292.
62. NCNB, 684 F.2d at 293.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
66. Id.
67. Factual differences between Central Texas and NCNB are discussed supra notes 12-
18 and accompanying text.
68. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1185.
69. Id. at 1183. The alleged "benefit exhausted" requirement is not, in fact, a requirement
of section 162. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
70. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976). See discussion supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
71. 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 (1983).
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savings and loan establishing a new office may deduct them.7 2 In Ellis
Banking, a section 162(a) deduction of investigatory costs incurred by El-
lis prior to its acquisition of another operational bank was disallowed by
the I.R.S. In that case, however, the Ellis court readily conceded that the
bank was "in the course of its business of promoting banks" 73 -clearly
satisfying the existing business requirement of section 162. The only issue
was whether the expenditures were ordinary. 4 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's
allegation that Central Texas did not meet the existing business require-
ment of section 162 is not only unsupported by the Ellis decision, but
appears contrary to the language in that case.
B. The Alleged Benefit Exhausted Requirement
The Central Texas court also addressed what was described as a sec-
ond requirement of section 162(a), that the "item be paid or incurred and
the benefit exhausted during the taxable year to be deductible. 7 5 While
there is, in fact, a "paid or incurred" requirement in section 162(a),7 6 no
such "benefit exhausted" requirement exists.
The Fifth Circuit apparently derived the "benefit exhausted" require-
ment from a misinterpretation of the purpose of the future benefit rule.
That rule, which does require that an expenditure's benefit be exhausted
during the taxable year to be-deductible, 7 was intended only as a tool for
determining which expenses were ordinary under section 162(a), 7 and not
as a separate requirement.
Not only was the Central Texas court incorrect in referring to a sepa-
rate "benefit exhausted" requirement of section 162(a), but its discussion
of that requirement is inconsistent with the court's subsequent endorse-
ment of the Lincoln test as the predominant consideration for the "ordi-
nary" requirement of section 162(a).80 The "benefit exhausted" test is
merely a rewording of the "future benefit rule," and the future benefit
rule was clearly rejected in the Lincoln decision in favor of the "separate
and distinct asset" test.8 1
72. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1183.
73. Ellis Banking, 688 F.2d at 1378.
74. Even as to the "ordinary" requirement, Ellis Banking provides a poor analogy. The
acquisition in Ellis Banking was of a fully operational and independent bank, with 35,000
shares of existing stock worth $10 per share. 41 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 37,759 (1983).
That acquisition is hardly comparable to developing a branch bank, which is totally depen-
dent on its parent at the outset.
75. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1183 (emphasis added).
76. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
77. United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957).
78. Id.
79. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1183.
80. Id. at 1184.
81. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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C. The Necessary and Ordinary Requirement
The third and central issue addressed by the Central Texas court was
the "necessary and ordinary expense" requirement of section 162(a).8 2
Conceding that the costs in dispute were necessary,8 3 the court concen-
trated on the application of the Lincoln test to the "ordinary" issue. Ac-
cording to the Lincoln test, if the expenditures created or enhanced a
separate and distinct additional asset, then they were capital in nature.
Disagreeing with the result in NCNB, the Central Texas court held that
the branch offices did constitute separate and distinct additional assets,
and that the related expenditures incurred prior to the opening of the
branches were capital in nature."
In so holding, the Central Texas court attempted to distinguish the
decision in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,5 which the NCNB
court relied upon heavily to support its holding that the bank branches
did not constitute separate and distinct additional assets.8 The Central
Texas court noted that the Briarcliff decision "distinguishes creation of a
branch office from mere expansion of existing services to new markets. 8 7
The Central Texas court interpreted this distinction to mean that if a
business merely expands existing services to new markets, no separate
and distinct additional asset is created; but, if the expansion involves the
creation of branch offices, it does create separate and distinct additional
assets.8
A close reading of the Briarcliff case indicates that this interpretation
is misguided. While Briarcliff does draw a distinction between the "mere
expansion of existing services to new markets" and the "creation of
branch offices," a branch office is considered a separate and distinct addi-
tional asset only if the "new. . .branch or division [is acquired] to make
and sell a new and different product." ' If the branch is not acquired for
the purpose of making or selling a new or different product, then it is not
a separate and distinct additional asset.
Applying this holding to the NCNB and Central Texas cases, the
banking services extended through the branch offices were no different
from the existing services offered; they certainly were not in the nature of
a "new and different product."90 Thus, the Fifth Circuit failed to ade-
82. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976).
83. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1183. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
84. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1185.
85. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1185.
88. Id.
89. Briarcliff, 475 F.2d at 782.
90. Id.
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quately distinguish Briarcliff from the facts of Central Texas.91
The court also attempted to distinguish the Central Texas facts from
those of the credit card cases upon which the NCNB court relied.92 Not-
ing that in the credit card cases there were no intangible property rights
created with new credit services, the Central Texas court claimed there
were intangible property rights created with the new savings and loan
branches.9 3 Yet the court failed to provide any authority affirmatively
supporting that claim.
9 4
Instead, the court emphasized what it perceived to be a "property
right" inherent in the branch's right to do business and challenge new
competitors. 5 Noting that the Central Texas branches acquired this new
property right upon being licensed, the Central Texas court concluded
that the branch offices constituted separate and distinct assets, and the
expenditures relating to them were capital in nature.96
Finally, the Central Texas court justified its finding that the expendi-
tures were capital rather than ordinary by rejecting the NCNB rationale
that the compulsory accounting methods of the Comptroller were an ac-
curate reflection of income.97 The court reasoned that a proper accounting
method should reflect the longevity of the benefits related to the expendi-
tures at issue.9 8 Thus, while it ostensibly rejected the "future benefit"
test, the Central Texas court concluded that the most accurate account-
ing method would be one which supported capitalization of the expendi-
91. Of course, the Fifth Circuit in Central Texas was not obliged to distinguish Briarcliff;
that case was only persuasive authority.
92. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
93. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1185.
94. The court does mention Skilken v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1969) (hold-
ing that goodwill of a company must be capitalized). That case, however, involved pur-
chased goodwill rather than self-developed goodwill.
Purchased goodwill is almost always treated as a capital item. See Note, Amortization of
Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Good Will, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 859 (1968). Self-developed goodwill, on the other hand, is rarely capitalized. See Gunn,
The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C.L. REv.
443, 489 (1974). Central Texas did not purchase a branch. If an analogy is to be made, it
should be to self-developed goodwill rather than purchased goodwill.
95. Central Tex., 731 F.2d at 1185. The court discusses the right to do business, to receive
new accounts for new customers in a new market, and to challenge new competitors. These
rights are all derived from the branch license, yet the court does not mention the license
itself as being a property right.
Concluding that the license is a separate capital asset only implies that costs related to
the license are capital expenditures; whereas concluding that the branch is a separate capi-
tal asset implies that all the contested expenditures are capital. Therefore, the Central






tures-one which accounted for the future benefit of the assets.99
III SEARCHING FOR A RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF THE Central Texas
DECISION
After an analysis of Central Texas, one is left with very little basis for
a rebuttal to the NCNB decision. The Central Texas court seemed to
stress the separate, tangible characteristics of a branch, noting that it was
separately staffed in an exclusive territory.100 Yet a branch office may use
funds of its parent or another branch to meet its own loan demands. 0 1
Undoubtedly, a new branch will use those funds before it builds up its
own local deposit accounts. Thus, while physically and structurally sepa-
rate, a branch office actually is quite dependent on, and interrelated with,
its parent bank.
The Central Texas court's failure to find authority in support of its
position is not surprising. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner
0 2
is one of the few cases to be found supporting the Central Texas view on
expansion costs.'10 In Houston Natural Gas, expenditures incurred for so-
licitation of new customers were held to be capital and, therefore, not
deductible.'" While dicta in that case supported the Central Texas re-
sult,10 the facts were easily distinguishable in that Houston Natural Gas
involved a very intense campaign to gain new customers and create a mo-
nopoly 0 6 while Central Texas was merely expanding through branches.
There is other limited support for the Central Texas result aside from
the dicta in Houston.Natural Gas. Despite rather persuasive evidence to
the contrary, 7 it has been argued that the Central Texas court was, in
fact, correct in distinguishing its case from the holding in Briarcliff
Candy Corp. v. Commissioner2os The basis for distinguishing Briarcliff is
that it, unlike Central Texas and NCNB, fell within the accepted rule
that expenditures for the protection of an investment are not capital in
nature. 09 However, the argument that the NCNB1 0 and Central Texas"'
99. Id. For a more detailed discussion on why the Comptroller's method of accounting is
arguably not the most accurate method, see NCNB, 651 F.2d at 954-55 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
100. Central Tex., 741 F.2d at 1185.
101. See, e.g., Snyder Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 542 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
102. 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937).
103. Although it was the case primarily relied on by the Commissioner in Briarcliff,
Houston was not mentioned in the Central Texas decision.
104. Houston Natural Gas, 90 F.2d at 817.
105. "[A]n intensive campaign to get new customers at anytime gives rise to capital ex-
penditures." Id.
106. Id. at 816-17.
107. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
108. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
109. See NCNB, 651 F.2d at 958-59.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
branching efforts were necessary to protect their respective market shares
of business is no less tenuous than the Fourth Circuit's argument that
Briarcliff's contested expenditures were for the protection of its busi-
ness.112 On the contrary, Briarcliff, the credit card cases,1 1 3 and several
recent letter rulings 14 provide a much more updated and analogous com-
parison to the deductibility issue than does the Houston Natural Gas
decision.1 15
With very little authority to support the conclusion that the branch
offices are separate, distinct assets, the contention that the branch license
itself is a separate asset remains the only alternative for the capitalization
argument. Yet, the authority supporting the concept of a license as an
"asset" is easily distinguished from the facts of Central Texas and
NCNB.' The right to challenge new competitors, allowed by a Texas
savings and loan branch license emphasized in Central Texas, is a right
granted to any interested party, with or without a license.11 7 In order for a
license to be considered capital, it should be transferable 18 to some ex-
tent and somewhat limited in number.11 9 Essentially, the only right ob-
tained with the branch office licenses in NCNB and Central Texas was
110. 684 F.2d at 290.
111. Central Texas did assert that it was attempting to maintain its relative position with
respect to the rest of the banking industry. Telephone Interview, supra note 17.
112. Briarcliff, 475 F.2d at 787.
113. Discussed supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Most notably, these cases ilus-
trate the application of the separate and distinct asset test, not in existence at the time of
Houston Natural Gas.
114. See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 8423005, 84 FED. TAXES (P-H) 2366, at 941 (A restaurant ex-
panding its business by opening restaurants in new geographical locations did not create
separate intangible assets.); Ltr. Rul. 8303012, 83 FED. TAXES (P-H) T 635 (Expenses in-
curred in developing operating procedures, testing new equipment and recruiting and train-
ing work force in connection with establishment of new manufacturing facility are deducti-
ble under section 162. Taxpayer has similar existing operational plants in other locations.);
Ltr. Rul. 8141033, 81 FED. TAXES (P-H) T 797 (Mutual savings bank expenditures for prelim-
inary costs to obtain approval and feasibility studies deductible since they were not start-up
costs.); Ltr. Rul. 8135031, 81 FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 796 (advertising, pre-opening rental and
merchandise premiums offered to new depositors are all to protect and expand bank's ex-
isting business-section 162 deduction allowed.). Despite the clear stand these letter rulings
take on deductibility of expansion costs, letter rulings carry little weight in court.
115. This is especially true since Houston Natural Gas was decided nearly 50 years ago.
See supra note 102.
116. In most of the license cases, the capitalization result emanated from the use of the
future benefit rule or the failure of the business to meet the existing business requirement.
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
117. Tzx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 2.07 (Vernon Supp. II 1984).
118. The thrust of the Lincoln discussion on transferability was not that it was a non-
essential characteristic, but that some minimal degree of transferability is important to the
capitalization of an asset. See Lincoln, 403 U.S. at 155. Contra Central Tex., 731 F.2d at
1185.




the non-transferable right to operate the branch,12 a right which alone is
not recognized as a capital item.1 21 Thus, expenditures relating to a sav-
ings and loan branch license would not be capital, unless a particular
state's laws created additional "capital" characteristics in the license not
present in Central Texas and NCNB.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the recent flourishing of branching activities throughout the
United States, and the directly conflicting results in NCNB and Central
Texas, there is a great likelihood that the issue of the deductibility of the
expenditures contested in those cases will reach the Supreme Court. 22
Despite a significant lack of authority on that issue, certain aspects could
be easily resolved.
The Senate language pertaining to section 195, while not controlling
because of its indirect relation to the issue, should favor the deductibility
of the controverted expenditures. The conflicting views on the most accu-
rate accounting method, however, appear to be more a result of, rather
than a determining factor in, the resolution of the "ordinary" issue.
The primary task before the Supreme Court would be the application
of its own "separate and distinct asset" test. 23 In view of the authority
favoring the deductibility of business expansion costs, the intangible
value of a branch office would probably not be viewed as a separate and
distinct asset. Thus, the Court should adopt the position of the NCNB
court that the costs relating to that value are deductible as section 162
business expenses. To hold otherwise would not only go against the
weight of authority on that issue, "but would be contrary to the objec-
tives of our expanding national economy."1 2 4
David Fields Webb
120. There was also no apparent limit on the number of licenses which could be granted
in either case.
121. See, e.g., Nachman, 191 F.2d 934 (the official cost of the license relating to right to
operate liquor store was ordinary expense; only the excess of that cost upon resale, which
related to other rights and privileges, was a capital expense).
122. Central Texas did not appeal because of temporary financial difficulties. Its primary
attorney was out of the country at the time of the decision and he returned too late to
persuade the savings and loan to appeal. Many Texas attorneys were reportedly "incensed"
at the outcome and the subsequent failure to appeal. Telephone Interview, supra note 17.
123. Acceptance of the Lincoln test has been widespread. See, e.g., Central Tex., 731 F.2d
at 184 (5th Cir. 1984); NCNB, 684 F.2d at 289-91 (4th Cir. 1982); First Security Bank of
Idaho v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1979); Iowa Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
505 F.2d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 1974); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775,
786 (2d Cir. 1973). There does not appear to be any reason for the court to draw an excep-
tion to its own rule with the branching scenario.
124. First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (D.S.C. 1976),
aff'd, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977).
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